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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
RALPH L. CONK, 
v. 
Plaintiff-
Appellant, 
Case No. 16227 
WALLACE L. CHAMBERS, M.D. 
and GRANGER MEDICAL CLINIC, 
a corporation, 
Defendants-
Respondents. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a medical malpractice action in which the 
plaintiff claims damages incident to renal failure fol-
lowing an intestinal by-pass procedure for obesity. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to a jury which returned a 
unanimous verdict in favor of defendants and against the 
plaintiff, no cause of action. Judgment on the verdict 
was entered on November 30, 1977. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendants seek affirmance of the judgment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendants object to plaintiff's statement of facts 
which is incomplete, argumentative and violative of the 
well-established principle that evidence and all reason-
able inferences that can be fairly drawn therefrom must 
be viewed in a light most favorable to the jury verdict 
and judgment entered thereon. Lee v. Howes, 548 P.2d 619 
(Utah 1976); Paull v. Zions First Nat'l. Bank, 18 Utah~ 
183, 417 P.2d 759 (1966). Accordingly, defendants submit 
their own statement of facts. 
The parties will be described as they appeared in 
the trial court. 
In March of 197 3, the plaintiff presented himself to 
Dr. Wallace Chambers, a Board-certified specialist in 
• • a' 
surgery, and requested the defendant to perform an intestin · 
by-pass procedure for treatment of the plaintiff's obesity 
and hypertension of long standing duration. (R. 767, 7901 
-2-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Mr. Conk had been under the care of specialists in internal 
medicine at the Granger Medical Clinic for treatment of 
exogenous obesity and hypertension since 1965 and sought 
surgical treatment for his condition at the suggestion of 
his physicians. (R. 1106, 1133, 992-93, 789) 
The intestinal by-pass procedure had been developed 
and used for more than twenty-five years as a surgical 
method to achieve weight loss in extremely obese patients. 
(R. 1197) The procedure itself involves removal of a 
large segment of the small intestine from the alimentary 
canal to reduce the area in which absorption of nutrients 
occurs. The "by-passed" segment of intestine remains 
intact in the abdominal cavity and can be reconnected 
should the need arise. During the 1960's, extensive 
studies with hundreds of patients had been conducted and 
reported in the medical literature. Although there was 
wide diversity among surgeons as to the optimum lengths 
of intestine to be left in the digestive tract, the pro-
cedure was considered safe and appropriate treatment for 
-3-
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morbid obesity. (R. 820-21, 1207-08, 1197-98) Dr. 
Chambers had studied the procedure for several years 
and had consulted with another expert in Philadelphia 
before he performed his first by-pass operation in 1968. 
(R. 783-85) 
When Dr. Chambers first examined the plaintiff, 
Mr. Conk was fifty years old, weighed 336 pounds and, 
although taking medications to control hypertension, had 
a blood pressure of 180/112. (R. 977, 1167) His records 
from prior years indicated that he had weighed as much u 
344 pounds and that his blood pressure had reached systolic 
levels of 204 and diastolic levels of 130. (R. 1133, 11191 
He exhibited shortness of breaih while at rest and had a 
skin color evidencing poor oxygenation which are indica-
tions of a "Pickwickian syndrome" often found in the 
morbidly obese. (R. 1160-67, 1201-02) Blood tests re-
vealed elevated levels of blood fats which are associat~ 
with cardio-vascular diseases. (R. 1163) Years of elevate 
blood pressure had also caused structural changes in t~ 
small blood vessels of the plaintiff's kidneys, a conditio: 
-4-
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known as hypertensive nephrosclerosis, which had caused 
minute amounts of protein to spill into the urine on three 
occasions before Dr. Chambers' initial examination. (R. 1256-
57, 1261-63) Experts for the plaintiff and for the defendants 
agreed that the plaintiff's obesity, hypertension and related 
problems prior to surgery were of such severity that, were 
he not treated, Mr. Conk would be expected to live only a 
few years. (R. 433, 1164, 913) Although the plaintiff was 
already acquainted with the operation because Dr. Chambers 
had performed an identical procedure on Mr. Conk's daughter 
approximately one month earlier, Dr. Chambers thoroughly 
reviewed the procedure with Mr. Conk, using diagrams as 
illustrations. (R. 992, 819) 
Dr. Chambers advised Mr. Conk that the procedure would 
be major surgery and would be "very dangerous" during the 
immediate post-operative period. (R. 1057, 1059, 819) 
Dr. Chambers told the plaintiff that he might not survive 
the surgery as the operation had an 8% mortality rate. 
(R. 1059-60, 802) He was also told that he could expect 
-5-
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to have severe diarrhea and nausea for a prolonged period of 
time and that his liver would be seriously damaged if he 
ever consumed alcohol. (R. 819, 994) Mr. Conk was also 
informed that he would receive injections and oral medica-
tions for at least two years to replace vitamins and min~~ 
that would not be absorbed naturally due to the by-pass. 
(R. 994) Finally, Dr. Chambers informed the plaintiff that 
the technique he intended to use was new and that, in Dr. 
Chambers' opinion, the operation should be considered 
"experimental." (R. 788, 1061-62) 
Before agreeing to perform the procedure, Dr. Chambers 
also questioned the plaintiff concerning methods of weight 
control and therapy for hypertension Mr. Conk had previously 
undertaken to determine if alternatives to surgery ought to 
be tried. (R. 804) Mr. Conk testified that he considered 
himself to be a very light eater and admitted that he had 
never been able to lose weight by dieting despite twenty 
years of urging from every physician who had treated him. 
(R. 1041, 1047-48) During the years, Mr. Conk had tried 
-6-
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various medications to suppress his appetite, but had 
found them to have undesireable side effects, including 
exacerbation of his hypertension. (R. 1046-47) The 
plaintiff also had learned of, but rejected, a weight 
reduction program whereby the patient's jaws are wired 
shut. (R. 1046-47) The plaintiff was unable to control 
his hypertension because of his extreme weight and because 
he failed to take, regularly and faithfully, the medica-
tions his physicians had prescribed. (R. 1129, 1139-40) 
In sununary, Mr. Conk's previous efforts to lose weight 
and to control his hypertension through diet and medica-
tion were unsuccessful' despite warnings from his physicians 
that he was "killing himself" by not following their 
instructions. (R. 1129, 1139-40) At the time he con-
sulted Dr. Chambers, the plaintiff admitted he was fearful, 
and justifiably so, of suffering a "stroke." (R. 1042) 
After confirming that he was an appropriate candidate 
for intestinal by-pass, Dr. Chambers admitted the plaintiff 
to the Valley West Hospital on April 21, 1973 for pre-
-7-
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operative tests with the expectation of performing the 
procedure on April 23, 1973. (R. 224) A complete 
battery of blood and urinalysis tests were performed, 
together with an electrocardiogram, chest x-rays and 
complete physical, which showed that the plaintiff was 
in fit and proper condition to undergo the contemplated 
surgery. (R. 1163, 833) Of particular importance to 
this action were tests which revealed perfectly normal 
renal function. (R. 824, 116 3) 
The by-pass procedure was performed without incident 
on April 23, 1973 and the plaintiff had an excellent 
post-operative course. (R. 1145) Dr. Chambers examined 
the plaintiff on a monthly basis following the operation 
and noted a steady loss in weight and a satisfactory 
reduction in blood pressure to normal and near normal 
levels. (R. 889, 814-15) Mr. Conk returned to work forty 
to sixty days after the operation and continued on what 
Dr. Chambers observed to be a totally satisfactory recow0· 
(R. 996, 1173, 1160, 1155) ' 'ff After five months, the pla1nt1 
-8-
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fl 
reported no complaints, except for fatigue, and was pleased 
with the results of the operation. (R. 1150) By May of 
1974, the plaintiff had reached a stable weight of 244 
pounds, had been "eating heavily and working hard." 
(R. 1153) 
On June 12, 1974, Dr. Chambers noted that the plaintiff's 
general health was good, that his blood pressure was normal 
and he ordered a routine battery of extensive blood tests. 
(R. 1154) The test results showed totally normal kidney 
function and no abnormalities of any kind in the blood 
chemistries. (R. 1154-55) During the remainder of 1974, 
the plaintiff continued to receive monthly examinations, 
reported minor ailments such as muscle cramps, fatigue and 
abdominal pains, but was otherwise progressing satisfactorily. 
(R. 1155-58) 
In response to the plaintiff's continuing complaints 
of fatigue and cramps in his legs and thighs, Dr. Chambers 
ordered another battery of blood tests on December 30, 1974. 
(R. 1153) The tests again showed totally normal kidney 
-9-
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function and no irregularities except for slightly low 
calcium levels for which Dr. Chambers prescribed a calcium 
supplement. (R. 1158) When the complaints of malaise or 
fatigue persisted, Dr. Chambers referred the plaintiff to 
a specialist in internal medicine for consul tat ion in late 
February, 1975. (R. 1160) As of that date, there had 
been no indications of any kind to suggest the possibility 
of renal damage and, to the contrary, blood tests had 
revealed perfectly normal kidney function. (R. 1161) 
On March 5, 1975, blood tests identical to those 
performed on December 30, 1974 were repeated which re-
vealed a sudden and dramatic change in renal function. 
(R. 1170) Within sixty-five days, kidney function had 
progressed from "excellent" to advanced and irreversib~ 
kidney failure. (R. 1275) Despite an exhaustive investi· 
gation by the kidney specialists, who treated the plaintiff, 
the cause of the renal failure remains unknown. (R. 12781 
There had never been a reported case of renal failure 
following by-pass surgery during the time Dr. Chambers 
-10-
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treated the plaintiff. (R. 1194, 1196) The first such 
case study ever reported appeared in December, 1975, and, 
at the time of trial, of the tens of thousands of by-pass 
procedures performed, only two cases of renal failure were 
described in the literature. (R. 1278-79, 1285-86) In 
each of the other cases, a disease process that could not 
be identified in the present action was found to have caused 
the kidney damage and ultimate renal failure. (R. 1327) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT SHOULD AFFIRM THE JUDGMENT ENTERED 
ON THE GENERAL VERDICT IF ONE OF THE 
DETERMINATIVE ISSUES SUBMITTED TO THE JURY 
WAS FREE FROM ERROR AND IF THE JURY'S 
FINDING ON THAT ISSUE WAS SUPPORTED BY 
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE 
The judgment of the lower court was entered in this 
action on a general verdict of the jury in favor of the 
defendants. The plaintiff neither requested special 
interrogatories on the several issues determinative of 
this proceeding nor objected to the general verdict form. 
In accordance with this Court's long-standing presumption 
-11-
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of validity in favor of the verdict of the jury and the 
judgment entered thereon, the Court must presume that 
the jury found all issues of liability in favor of the 
defendants. Accordingly, if one of the issues submitted 
to the jury was free from error and if the jury's finding 
on that issue was supported by substantial evidence, the 
judgment of the lower court must be affirmed. 
This Court has long recognized a presumption of 
validity in favor of all aspects of a verdict challenged 
on appeal. In Lawrence v. Bamberger R.R. Co., 3 Utah 2d 
247, 282 P.2d 335 (1955), for example, the Court affirm~ 
the judgment of the lower cour~ and stated: 
When the court has made findings and 
entered judgment thereon as was done 
here, it is then our duty to review 
the evidence in the light most favor-
able to the findings, and they must 
be allowed to stand if reasonable 
minds would agree with them. Likewise 
every reasonable intendment ought to 
be indulged in favor of the validity 
and correctness of the judgment under 
review and it will not be disturbed 
unless the appellant meets his burden 
of affirmatively showing error. 
282 P.2d at 337 (Emphasis added) 
-12-
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Similarly, in Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake City v. 
Mitsui Investment, Inc., 522 P.2d 1370 (Utah 1974), the 
Court affirmed a judgment on a jury verdict and stated: 
This case falls within the framework of 
the fundamental principle: That what the 
parties are entitled to is a fair oppor-
tunity to present their respective cases 
to a court and jury for determination. 
When this has been accomplished, all 
presumptions favor the verity of the 
verdict and the judgment; and this 
includes all aspects of the conduct of 
the proceedings, and rulings of the court. 
552 P.2d at 1374 (Emphasis added) 
See, also, Burton v. Zions Co-op Mercantile Institution, 
122 Utah 360, 247 P.2d 514 (1952); Evell & Son, Inc. v. 
Salt Lake City Corp.; 27 Utah 2d 188, 493 P.2d 1283 (1972); 
Robinson v. Hreinson, 17 Utah 2d 261, 409 P.2d 121 (1965); 
Dalton v. Wadley, 11 Utah 84, 355 P.2d 69 (1960). 
As one aspect of the presumption in favor of a judg-
ment, this Court, in accordance with an impressive majority 
of jurisdictions throughout the country, has recognized 
that when several issues determinative of an action are 
submitted to the trier of fact and the basis for decision 
-13-
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is unknown, it is the duty of the court to presume that 
the trier of fact relied upon a proper theory and upon 
proper evidence. In McLaughlin v. Chief Consolidated 
Mining Co., 220 P. 726 (Utah 1923), for example, the 
Court considered a general verdict in favor of the plai~ 
tiff and against the mining company in a negligence case 
in which the mining company's agent was exonerated from 
liability. Rejecting the appellant's contention that 
the general verdict in favor of the agent also exonerated 
the principal, the Court assumed that the jury had adopt~ 
a theory of liability that could properly be sustained on 
appeal. Affirming the judgment, the Court stated: 
If the evidence supports the theory 
that the mining company was liable 
without taking into consideration 
anything that [the agent] did or 
said, or that he failed to do, it 
is the duty of this court to assume 
that the jurors adopted the theory 
supported by the evidence. 220 P. 
at 731 (Emphasis added) 
Similarly, in Rose v. Strike, 10 Utah 2d 72, 348 P.U 
563 (1960), the Court reviewed a judgment in an action 
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where the trial court failed to render an opinion stating 
the basis of his decision. Noting that claims could have 
been based on at least one and perhaps more theories, the 
Court nevertheless affirmed stating: 
[W]e will indulge ourselves in assuming 
that the trial court concluded as he did 
on a proper theory. The record disclosed 
no request for such an opinion and no 
exception to the lack of it. 348 P.2d 
at 564. 
The presumption applied by the Utah court to sustain a 
judgment or general verdict where one, but not necessarily 
all, of several counts, issues or theories submitted to 
the trier of fact was free from error and supported by 
substantial evidence is widely recognized and approved in 
other jurisdictions as the "two issue rule." 
In Colonial Stores, Inc. v. Scarborough, 355 So.2d 1181 
(Fla. 1978), the Supreme Court of Florida recently adopted 
the two issue rule as the better reasoned approach both 
as a matter of policy and in view of the presumption of 
validity afforded to judgments challenged on appeal. In 
that case, the plaintiff had obtained a general verdict in 
an action for malicious prosecution and false imprisonment. 
-15-
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An intermediate appellate court sustained the judgment 
upon a finding of sufficient evidence of malicious pro-
secution and did not address alleged errors pertaining 
to the false imprisonment count. Affirming the decision 
of the intermediate court, the Supreme Court addressed 
the "two issue rule" as follows: 
The question arises where two or more 
issues are left to the jury, and of 
which [one or more] may be determina-
tive of the case, and a general verdict 
is returned, making it impossible to 
ascertain the issue(s) upon which the 
verdict was founded. One line of 
authority holds that reversal is im-
proper where no error is found as to 
one of the issues, as the appellant 
is unable to establish that he has been 
prejudiced. This is known in jurispru-
dence as the "two issue" rule. It is a 
rule of policy, designed to simplify the 
work of the trial courts and to limit 
the scope of proceedings on review. 
The weight of authority to the contrary 
mandates a reversal where error has 
affected one issue unless it is clear 
that the complaining party has not been 
injured thereby. 355 So.2d at 1186 
(Citations omitted) 
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The Supreme Court recognized and adopted the "two issue" 
rule as a better view supported by greater weight of 
authority. The Court dismissed arguments that injustice 
could result from adoption of the rule because counsel 
may simply request a special verdict as to each count in 
a case to determine the basis for the jury's decision. 
The Court therefore concluded: 
Where the District Court determined under 
these circumstances that one of the issues 
submitted to the jury was free from pre-
judicial error, it will be presumed that 
all issues were decided in favor of the 
prevailing party and the judgment will be 
affirmed. Id. 
The "two issue" rule applies equally to general 
verdicts in favor of the plaintiff or in favor of the 
defendant. In Royal Homes, Inc. v. Dalene Hardwood 
Flooring Co., Inc., 199 A.2d 698 (Conn. 1964), the 
Court held that the failure to properly instruct the 
jury with respect to one of the defendant's defenses 
was harmless error because the general verdict in favor of 
the defendants was presumed to be based on a second and 
separate defense. The Court stated: 
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The fact that there were these two 
distinct defenses brought into opera-
tion the rule expressed in Meglio v. 
Corneau, 137 Conn. 551, 553, 79 A.2d 
187, 188: "The Connecticut rule may 
be stated as follows: If there is no 
error in the instructions as to one 
of two distinct defenses, a general 
verdict for the defendant should be 
sustained . . . . To qualify under 
this definition, the defenses must 
be distinct. That is the decisive 
test." 199 A.2d at 700. 
The "two issue" rule has been expressly adopted in 
the vast majority of jurisdictions that have considered 
the question. See,~., State Tax Commission v. Magma 
Copper Co., 41 Ariz. 97, 15 P.2d 961 (1932); Reese v. 
Cradit, 12 Ariz.App. 233, 469 P.2d 467 (1970); Berger v. 
Southern Pacific Co., 144 Cal.App.2d 1, 300 P.2d 170 
(1956); Brignoli v. Seaboard Transportation Co., 171 
P.2d 518, Sub. Opinion 178 P.2d 445 (Cal.App. 1947); 
Messier v. Zanglis, 144 Conn. 449, 133 A.2d 619 (1957); 
Meglio v. Corneau, 137 Conn. 551, 79 A.2d 187 (1951); 
Whitaker v. Creedon, 99 Ga.App. 228, 108 S.E.2d 335 (1959): 
Moore v. Jewel Tea co., 46 Ill.2d 288, 263 N.E.2d 103 (19lt 
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Goldschmidt v. Chicago Transit Authority, 335 Ill.App. 
461, 82 N.E.2d 357; Ohio Finance Co. v. Berry, 219 Ind. 
97, 37 N.E.2d 2 (1941); Gossett v. Metropolitan Life Ins. 
Co., 208 N.C. 152, 179 S.E. 438 (1935); Knisely v. 
Community Traction Co., 125 Ohio St. 131, 180 N.E. 654 
(1932); Alexander v. Hair, 38 N.E.2d 601 (Ohio App. 1942); 
Anderson v. West, 241 S.E.2d 551 (S.Ct. S.C. 1978); ~ 
v. Christensen, 77 S.D. 381, 92 N.W.2d 199 (1958); McSoley 
v. Hogan, 40 A.2d 599 (S.Ct. R.I. 1944); Tenn. Cent. Ry. 
v. Umenstetter, 155 Tenn. 235, 291 S.W. 452 (1927); 
Clinchfield R.R. v. Forbes, 57 Tenn.App. 174, 417 S.W.2d 
210 (1966). Other states have also recognized that a jury, 
by its general verdict, is pre~umed to have found all 
issues in favor of the prevailing party. ~· ~., 
Armstrong v. Greshaam, 73 Colo. 46, 213 P. 114 (1923); 
Ratcliff v. Murphy, 150 Mont. 31, 430 P.2d 627 (1967); 
Hutchinson Lumber Co. v. Scrivener, 91 Okla. 293, 217 P. 
854 (1923); Lumbliner v. Ruge, 21 Wash. 2d 881, 153 P.2d 694 
(1944). 
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In the present case, the defendants advanced three 
separate and distinct defenses at the time of trial: 
First, that the defendants were not negligent; second, 
that any negligence was not the proximate cause of the 
plaintiff's renal failure; and third, that the plaintiff's 
claims were barred by the statute of limitations. Since 
it must be presumed that the jury found in favor of the 
defendants on all three issues, each of which is disposi-
tive of the action, the Court should affirm the general 
verdict if any one of the issues can be sustained on appeal. 
POINT II 
THE JURY FOUND UNDER PROPER INSTRUCTIONS 
AND UPON SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE THAT THE 
DEFENDANTS WERE NOT NEGLIGENT 
The plaintiff asserts as grounds for reversal two 
issues that relate to the defendants' conduct. First, 
the plaintiff argues that Dr. Chambers negligently failed 
to obtain an informed consent and that the jury was not 
properly instructed on that issue. With respect to 
informed consent, the plaintiff specifically claims that 
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Dr. Chambers should have advised him that the by-pass 
procedure was "experimental" and that the operation was 
ill-advised because of the condition of the plaintiff's 
kidneys prior to surgery. Second, the plaintiff assails 
the court's refusal to give certain instructions pur-
porting to define the standard of care required of the 
defendant. Since the plaintiff submits no other allega-
tions of error upon which the defendant's conduct is 
challenged, no additional claims will be addressed. 
A. The Defendant Disclosed All Substantial 
And Significant Risks Of The Procedure 
And The Jury Was Properly Instructed As 
To That Issue. 
This Court has previously recognized the physician's 
duty to disclose to a patient the material and usual, but 
not highly speculative, risks of medical treatment. 
Ficklin v. MacFarlane, 550 P.2d 1295 (Utah 1976) That 
duty is now codified in the Utah Health Care Malpractice 
Act which requires physicians to inform patients of 
"substantial and significant" risks of a proposed proce-
dure. Utah code Ann., § 78-14-5 (1953) The jury correctly 
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found that Dr. Chambers complied in all respects with 
that duty. 
The plaintiff stresses in his brief the argument 
that the intestinal by-pass procedure was "experimental" 
in that the medical profession by 1973 had acquired too 
little knowledge to anticipate the risks attendant to 
that operation. The jury quite properly rejected that 
proposition. Dr. Daniel Hunter, an experienced Ogden 
surgeon, who at the time of trial had performed 160 by-pass 
operations, testified that the usual and expected results 
of the procedure were known as early as 1963 when one of 
the foremost proponents of the operation reported on 
sixteen years of experience and follow-up with his patients. 
(R. 1197) Dr. Hunter flatly rejected the suggestion of 
plaintiff's counsel that the procedure was still "experi-
mental" when he stated: 
I did not consider it experimental or 
I wouldn't have been doing it in private 
practice. I considered it an operation 
that had been observed for eight years, 
had been tried in a large enough series 
and had some expected results. I have 
found that there are some additional 
problems that I have become acquainted 
with as the time has gone on since I 
first started doing them. There may be 
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others in the future, but this is true 
whether I'm talking about gastric surgery 
or colon surgery, it's true of every 
phase of surgery. We are making advances. 
We can't know everything about everything 
that is done. We get a reasonable ex-
perience with it, and then we can start 
to use it with expectation that it is 
going to be an improvement in the patient's 
health. (R. 1028) 
Whether the procedure was in fact "experimental" is 
inconsequential in any event because the jury reasonably 
concluded that the plaintiff was advised of Dr. Chambers' 
opinion that the operation should be considered to be 
"experimental." Dr. Chambers testified that he so informed 
the plaintiff and Mr. Conk admitted that the defendant 
described the operation as "a n~w procedure." (R. 788, 
1062) The matter of witness credibility, of course, falls 
within the province of the jury. As this Court stated in 
Gittens v. Lundberg, 3 Utah 2d 392, 284 P.2d 1115 (1955): 
It is the duty of this court to leave 
the question of credibility of wit-
nesses to the jury or finder of fact 
and we have quite consistently adhered 
to that policy. As has often been said, 
the jury is in a favored position to 
form impressions as to the trust to be 
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reposed in witnesses. They have the 
advantage of fairly close personal 
contact; the opportunity to observe 
appearance and general demeanor; and 
the chance to feel the impact of per-
sonalities. All of which they may 
consider in connection with the re-
actions, manner of expression and 
apparent frankness and candor or want 
of it in reacting to and answering 
questions on both direct and cross-
examination in determining whether, 
and to what extent, witnesses are to 
be believed. Whereas, the appellate 
court is handicapped by being limited 
to a review of an impersonal record. 
284 P.2d at 1117. 
See, also, Lamkin v. Lynch, Utah Supreme Ct. No. 15683 
(Aug. 27, 1979). 
The contention that Dr. Chambers had a duty to 
inform the plaintiff of a kidn~y "problem" that was 
alleged to be a contraindication to the by-pass surgery 
is equally meritless. The uncontroverted evidence was 
that the plaintiff's kidney function was totally normal 
immediately prior to the operation. (R. 824, 116 3) The 
only indication prior to surgery of any abnormal kidney 
condition was the presence of protein in the plaintiff's 
urine that was observed on three occasions prior to surger: 
-24-
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(R. 1256-57, 1261-63) The specialist in kidney diseases 
who treated the plaintiff testified that the incidents 
of proteinuria were the result of the plaintiff's long-
standing hypertension and that the condition would be 
expected to improve dramatically and perhaps disappear 
entirely upon a reduction in blood pressure brought 
about by weight loss. (R. 1256-57, 1261-63, 1272) The 
evidence established that the plaintiff's hypertensive 
nephrosclerosis was not a contraindication to any need 
of surgery and, to the contrary, the objectives of the 
surgery were expected to improve the condition. (R. 1271, 
1273, 1194, 1211, 1222) 
The plaintiff's challenges to the court's instructions 
on informed consent likewise must fail for several reasons. 
First, there was no evidence upon which to rest a claim of 
lack of informed consent under any theory. Renal failure 
of the type present in this action was unknown to the 
medical profession in 1973. (R. 1194, 1278-79) Even at 
the time of trial, only two reports of renal failure had 
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been published among the tens of thousands of by-pass 
patients. (R. 1278-79, 1285-86) Under such circumstances, 
as a matter of law, Dr. Chambers could not be held liable 
for failing to disclose such a risk. See, Ficklin v. 
McFarlane, 550 P. 2d 1295 (Utah 1976) (concurring opinion). 
It was also conclusively established that the condition of 
hypertensive nephrosclerosis was not a contraindication 
to surgery nor was it related in any way to the ultimate 
renal failure. (R. 1271, 1273, 1194, 1211, 1222, 1282) 
In short, undisclosed "risks" of which the plaintiff 
complains were never shown to be material, substantial or 
usual complications of the by-pass procedure. 
Second, the challenged instructions when viewed in 
light of the evidence are not inherently inconsistent. 
The plaintiff complains that the defendant's proffered 
instruction limits the duty of disclosure to those risks 
which would have been disclosed as a part of accepted 
medical practice among surgeons practicing in accordance 
with the applicable standard of care. (R. 155) The 
-26-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
defendants believe that instruction correctly states the 
law that exists in Utah as well as the majority of other 
jurisdictions. Cf. Marsh v. Pemberton, 10 Utah 2d 40, 
347 P.2d 1108 (1959); Anno. Modern Status of Views As to 
General Measure of Physician's Duty to Inform Patient of 
Risks of Proposed Treatment, 88 ALR3d 1008 (1978). In any 
event, no witnesses testified nor was any contention made 
that the standard of care applicable to Dr. Chambers 
required less than full disclosure of any and all sub-
stantial and usual risks known to accompany the by-pass 
procedure. Accordingly, any conflict in the language of 
the subject instructioni and any difference in the theories 
proposed by the respective parties are wholly incense-
quential under the facts of this case. 
B. The Court Properly Instructed The Jury 
As To The Standard Of Care Applicable 
To The Defendants. 
In Swan v. Lamb, 584 P.2d 814 (Utah 1978), the Court 
expressly adopted the rule that a physician is held to a 
standard of care that is shown to exist in that physician's 
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conununity or in conununities similar to the one in which 
he practices. The rationale for adopting the "same or 
similar locality" rule was stated by the Chief Justice as 
follows: 
[T]here is no reason to hold that 
doctors in Salt Lake City who profess 
to be experts in a field of surgery or 
medicine should not be held to the 
standard of care exercised by experts 
in the same field in cities of compar-
able size and throughout the medical 
profession. 584 P.2d at 817. 
Although this action was tried in 1977, the trial 
court accepted the plaintiff's requested instructions a~ 
charged the jury in accordance with the same or similar 
locality rule subsequently adopted in Swan. The court's 
instruction no. 14 states, in its relevant part: 
You are instructed that a treating 
physician and surgeon who specializes 
in a field of medicine has a duty in the 
diagnosis and treatment of a patient to 
exercise the degree of skill exacted by 
the professional standards of said 
specialty in the conununity or similar 
conununities wherein said specialty is 
practiced. The failure of such a 
specialist to treat a patient in con-
formity to such standards would be 
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negligence. In this connection, if you 
should find and believe from a prepon-
derance of the evidence that Dr. Chambers 
failed to treat plaintiff in accordance 
with the professional standards of his 
specialty as a Board certified surgeon 
. . . then you are instructed that said 
defendant physician was negligent. 
(R. 153) 
The court further instructed the jury in instruction 
no. 18 as follows: 
You are instructed that a physician who 
becomes licensed to practice his profes-
sion and who undertakes the treatment 
of a patient impliedly represents that 
he possesses, and it is his duty to 
possess, that degree of learning and 
skill ordinarily possessed by physicians 
of good standing in the same or similar 
communities. F.urthermore, if a physi-
cians [sic) becomes Board certified and 
undertakes to practice in a specialized 
field of medicine, he impliedly repre-
sents that he possesses, and it is his 
duty to possess, that degree of learning 
and skill ordinarily possessed by Board 
certified physicians practicing said 
specialty in the same or similar commu-
nities. 
It is the further duty of a Board certified 
physician in the treatment of a patient to 
use the judgment and skill and possess the 
knowledge ordinarily used and possessed by 
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Board certified physicians practicing 
his specialty in the same or similar 
conununities in order to accomplish the 
purpose for which he is employed. 
In determining whether Dr. Chambers ful-
filled the duties imposed upon him as a 
Board certified surgeon, you are not 
permitted to set up a standard of your 
own, but must look to the testimony and 
evidence presented by physicians at the 
trial as to what the standard of care 
was at the time in question. (R. 157) 
The court permitted plaintiff's experts to testify 
that they were familiar with the standard of care applicab! 
to surgeons practicing in Salt Lake County and in similu 
conununi ties and to express their opinions concerning that 
standard of care. In view of that testimony, the instruc· 
tions as a whole leave no serious question but that the 
meaning of the words "same and similar conununities" was 
conveyed to and understood by the jury. Under such ci~ 
cumstances, the court's refusal to give plaintiff's 
requested instruction nos. 9, 10 and 13 which purport~ 
define "community" and "similar conununities" could not be 
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prejudicial error. Downey v. Gemini Mining Co., 68 P. 414 
(Utah 1902). 
POINT III 
THE JURY PROPERLY FOUND THAT THE 
CONDUCT COMPLAINED OF DID NOT 
PROXIMATELY CAUSE THE PLAINTIFF'S DAMAGES 
As a separate and distinct defense, the defendants 
asserted at trial that the conduct of Dr. Chambers of 
which the plaintiff complained was not the proximate cause 
of any damage. Specifically, the defendants maintained 
~ that a reasonably prudent person in the plaintiff's position 
immediately before surgery would have consented to the 
procedure with knowledge of the additional risks that 
Dr. Chambers allegedly failed to disclose. In addition, 
the defendants argued that the by-pass procedure and Dr. 
Chambers' pre-operative and post-operative care of which 
the plaintiff complained were not the proximate cause of 
the plaintiff's renal failure. The jury correctly decided 
these issues in favor of the defendants in view of the 
~ substantial evidence to support such claims. 
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The court instructed the jury that to prevail on t~ 
informed consent issue, the plaintiff must prove: 
That a reasonably prudent person who 
had been considering an intestinal 
by-pass operation for weight reduction 
would have ref used the operation if 
such disclosure had been made by the 
defendant. In determining what a 
reasonably prudent person in the 
plaintiff's position would do under 
the circumstances, you must use the 
viewpoint of the patient before the 
surgery was performed and before oc-
currence of any complications or 
harmful results alleged to have re-
sulted from the surgery. (Instruction 
No. 16, R. 155) 
The court's instruction conforms to the universally 
recognized rule that there must be a causal relationsh~ 
between failure to inform and injury to the patient. 
See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 
1972); Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal.App. 3d 299, 104 Cal.Rptr. 
505, 502 P.2d 1 (1972); Utah Health Care Malpractice Act 
Utah Code Ann.,§ 78-14-5 (1953). The testimony of the 
patient is not decisive because the test is objective, 
not subjective. Canterbury, Id. at 787, Cobbs, Id. at 
11. 
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In the present case, the plaintiff was morbidly obese 
when he first consulted Dr. Chambers. His treating physi-
cian and other experts who testified on behalf of both 
parties agreed that he had a life expectancy of between 
three to five years if his weight and blood pressure were 
not brought under control. (R. 433, 1164, 913) Years of 
efforts by specialists in internal medicine had failed to 
achieve lasting results and the plaintiff admitted that 
his efforts at voluntary weight control had never been 
successful. (R. 1041, 1047-48, 1129, 1139-40) In short, 
the need for treatment was urgent and among the limited 
options available, the by-pass procedure had much to offer. 
As Dr. Daniel Hunter testified: 
Q. Alright. Does the surgery, the 
intestinal by-pass, does this 
have benefits or expected bene-
fits as to any of the conditions 
you have just mentioned? 
A. Yes, sir. The weight loss itself 
makes for a better quality of life 
for these people. They are able 
to get around much easier. It 
does take a great load off the 
heart. It has very definitely 
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resulted in lowering a blood 
pressure in the majority of cases 
that have been so treated. It has 
relieved diabetes for people who 
have had this problem. It has 
helped the excess load on joints. 
It has improved, in my opinion, 
the health of many, many people. 
{R. 1192) 
The procedure had been used for more than twenty-five year: 
as a surgical method to achieve weight loss and had been 
the subject of extensive studies that were reported in 
the medical literature. {R. 1197) By 1973, the procedure 
was considered safe and appropriate treatment. (R. 820-21, 
1207-08, 1197-98) 
The jury properly concluded that a reasonable, pr~ 
dent patient in the plaintiff's condition who faced the 
probability of impending death would accept the surgery 
despite the remote risk of possible complications that 
were as yet unknown. As Dr. Hunter stated, the risk that 
rare complications unknown at the time of treatment may 
at some future date become known exists with virtually all 
types of medical treatment. (R. 1208) 
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With respect to the contention that Dr. Chambers 
should have informed the plaintiff of the nature of his 
pre-existing kidney "problem", the evidence clearly 
established that the condition was an indication for, 
rather than an additional risk of, the proposed procedure. 
(R. 1194, 1258, 1271, 1273) The condition of hyperten-
sivenephrosclorosis was improved as a consequence of the 
procedure and did not contribute in any way to the ultimate 
kidney failure. (R. 1273, 1277) 
Finally, the jury also properly found that Dr. 
Chambers' treatment was not the proximate cause of the 
renal failure. Dr. Ch~mbers examined the plaintiff on 
a monthly basis and performed p~riodic tests of kidney 
function throughout the post-operative period. Renal 
function was "excellent" through the end of December, 1974 
and there were no indications of any kind to suggest the 
possibility of kidney damage. (R. 1274-75, 1268, 1287-88, 
1333) Without warning, renal function suddenly and ir-
reversibly declined. (R. 1275-76) 
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As a part of their treatment of the plaintiff, 
specialists at the University of Utah Medical Center 
performed exhaustive tests to determine the cause of the 
kidney failure. Dr. Allan Bloomer, a specialist in 
kidney disease who heads the Division of Kidney Disease 
in the Department of Internal Medicine at the University 
of Utah, directed the effort and testified at trial as ~ 
his findings. Microscopic, electron microscopic and 
sophisticated immunologic screening procedures were 
performed that failed to identify the disease process 
that damaged the plaintiff's kidneys. (R. 1255, 1278) 
The plaintiff's case was unlike any other reported in 
the medical literature, including the two reported inci-
dents of renal failure following intestinal by-pass pro-
cedures. (R. 1327) 
The plaintiff was required to prove with a reason~~ 
medical probability that the renal failure was the resuU 
of negligence on the part of the defendants. It is not 
sufficient to show that the kidney failure "might have" ~ 
"could have" resulted from such treatment. Denny v. ~ 
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Hospital, 21 Utah 2d 189, 442 P.2d 944 (1968). The jury 
properly concluded that the plaintiff failed to sustain that 
burden. 
In summary, the evidence clearly supports a finding 
that the plaintiff failed to establish a causal connection 
between any alleged misconduct of the defendant and the 
ultimate renal failure. For this reason, the jury's 
verdict should be affirmed. 
POINT IV 
THE COURT'S INSTRUCTIONS ON THE STATUTE OF 
LIMITATIONS WERE NOT ERRONEOUS AS TO 
MATTERS TO WHICH THE PLAINTIFF OBJECTED AT TRIAL 
Rule 51, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides that 
all objections to jury instructions are waived as to those 
matters not specifically brought to the Court's attention 
at the time of trial. The Rule provides, in its pertinent 
part: 
No party may assign as error the giving 
or the failure to give an instruction 
unless he objects thereto. In objecting 
to the giving of an instruction, a party 
must state distinctly the matter to which 
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he objects and the grounds for his 
objection. 
The Court has strictly construed the provisions of Rule 
51 and has consistently required specificity as to the 
precise matter to which the party objects and detail as 
to the grounds for objection. 
In Employers' Mutual Liability Ins. Co. v. Allen Oil 
Co., 123 Utah 253, 258 P.2d 445 (1953), for example, the 
Court refused to review challenges to a jury instruction 
to which the appellant objected in general terms at the 
time of trial. The Court stated: 
The objection should be specific enough 
to give the trial court notice of the 
very error in the instruction which is 
complained of on appeal. But an ob-
jection that an instruction is "not 
supported by, and is contrary to, the 
law" lacks specificness and does not 
direct the court's attention to anything 
in particular. 258 P.2d at 450. 
The Court reaffirmed its policy of strictly construing ~ 
requirements of Rule 51 in the more recent decision in 
Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake City v. Barrutia, 526~ 
47 (1974). In that case, the appellants excepted to an 
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instruction as "being contrary to the law and on the grounds 
that it is confusing, misleading and does not comport with 
the evidence and testimony in the trial." Citing Employers' 
Mutual, the Court held: 
Since defendants failed to point out 
with the requisite degree of particu-
larity wherein the instruction was not 
supported by the law, this court will 
not consider the instruction on its 
merits. 526 P.2d at 51. 
In Dimmick v. Utah Fuel Co., 49 Utah 430, 164 P. 872 
(1917), the Court also refused to review portions of an 
instruction to which the party had not specifically objected 
at the time of trial. In that case, the appellant had 
taken exception to only a portion of the instruction and 
the Court stated: 
Appellants' counsel, in their brief, 
contend that the instruction was er-
roneous and prejudicial in other 
particulars, but we find no exceptions 
were taken in the court below to such 
other portions of the instruction now 
complained of, and therefore this court 
cannot here for the first time consider 
them as grounds for reversal. 164 P. at 
874-75. 
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In the present case, plaintiff made specific ob-
jections to instruction nos. 24 and 25 only insofar as 
those instructions provided that the plaintiff had an 
affirmative duty to make inquiries and to learn the natun 
and cause of any injurious consequences of the defendant's 
treatment. (R. 1338) In all other respects, plaintiff's 
counsel simply objected to those instructions on the basis 
that they were a "misstatement of the law." (R. 1338) 
With respect to those matters to which plaintiff's 
counsel took specific exception, the Court did not err. 
The statute of limitations in force at the time the 
plaintiff's action accrued was Utah Code Ann., § 78-12-281: 
which was enacted as Chapter 212, § 1, Laws of Utah, 1971. 
It provided that medical malpractice actions had to be 
brought 
[T]wo years after the date of injury or 
two years after the plaintiff discovers, 
or through the use of reasonable dili-
~~· should have discovered the injury 
. . . . (Emphasis added) 
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By the express terms of the statute, patients are charged 
with the responsibility to make reasonable inquiry to 
determine the nature, extent and cause of any untoward 
consequences of medical treatment. That duty was most 
recently recognized by this Court in Foil v. Ballinger, 
Utah Supreme Ct. No. 16071 (Sept. 19, 1979) where the 
Court stated: 
Another safeguard against tardy claims 
is the requirement that a person exer-
cise "reasonable diligence" in determining 
the nature and cause of his or her injury. 
Whether the plaintiff exercised "reasonable diligence" 
in this action was clearly a factual question that was 
properly submitted to the jury. The plaintiff was entitled 
to rely upon the assurances of Dr. Chambers only insofar as 
it was "reasonable" for him to do so. The existence of a 
patient/physician relationship clearly does not entirely 
absolve a patient from the duty to exercise "reasonable 
diligence." 
In all other respects, the plaintiff's objections to 
instruction nos. 24 and 25 are raised for the first time 
on appeal and need not be considered. 
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CONCLUSION 
The trial of this action was corrunenced on November 14, 
1977, and was concluded more than two weeks later on 
November 29, 1977. An exhaustive effort on the part of 
the Court, the parties and their counsel and the lay and 
expert witnesses was made to present the facts of this 
complex medical case to the jury in a fair and comprehend· 
able fashion and to explain the law upon which the various 
issues were to be decided. Those objectives having been 
accomplished, the trial court properly submitted all issues 
to the jury for final disposition. The parties receiveda 
full, fair and impartial trial, and this Court should 
therefore affirm the judgment entered on the jury's verdict 
in favor of the defendants. 
The jury correctly found upon proper instructions 
that Dr. Chambers' treatment of the plaintiff was in all 
respects appropriate and that his care did not proximaU~ 
cause the plaintiff's renal failure. Throughout the tri~ 
of this action, the parties, counsel and the court knew th:' 
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jury's decision on those issues, and none other, would 
determine the ultimate outcome of this litigation. On 
appeal, this Court must presume that the jury found those 
issues in favor of the defendants and since those findings 
are amply supported by the record, the judgment of the 
court below should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted this 5th day of November, 1979. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
· ental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: 521-9000 
Attorneys for Defendants-
Respondents 
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